MANUELE GRAGNOLATI
CHRISTOPH F. E. HOLZHEY

Beginnings
Constituting Wholes, Haunting, Plasticity

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Wholes are said to be more than the sum of their parts. This ‘more’ contains both a promise and a threat. When different elements — which might be individuals, cultures, disciplines, or methods — form a whole, they not only join forces but also generate a surplus from which the parts can benefit. Being part of a whole is a way to acquire meaning and to extend beyond one’s limited existence; and having a part in the whole is to have an enlarged agency. But wholes are also more powerful than the sum of their parts. Wholes constitute their parts: they determine what is a part and what is apart, what can become a part, and which parts have no part. Even if parts therefore may not be said to pre-exist a whole, there may still be something in them that exceeds being a part — if only the possibility of being part of a different whole.

While a desire for being whole or being part of a whole seems all too natural, organic metaphors — which are often used to think part–whole relationships — have been criticized since they tend to naturalize relations of hierarchy and power. Yet entirely abandoning the whole in favour of the part(icular) is also problematic. After the disenchantments of the postmodern, post-cold-war period, and in the face of global crises — be they financial, economic, political, or ecological — there is a renewed urgency to the critical need for holistic perspectives. At the same time, there is growing concern that the ‘situatedness’ of any such perspective and the multiple, incommensurable ways of constituting wholes may be forgotten.

How are wholes differently constituted, and how do wholes constitute, determine, and control their parts? Do ontological, epistemological, aesthetic, and affective registers interrelate in different ways in material, symbolic, narrative, and psychological constructions? Can wholes emerge spontaneously from a collection of elements and their relations, from interactions or intra-actions? Does their constitution necessarily involve exclusion — not only of some parts and of other conceivable wholes but also of some aspects of the constituting elements? And insofar as exclusion involves loss or violence, to what
extent does it help to consider the totality of potential constitutions? From what position can this totality be postulated if not from a necessarily partial perspective within? What is gained by shifting to notions such as complex systems, assemblages, entanglement, or hybridity?

These were some of the questions with which this book project began for most of the contributors, under the working title Constituting Wholes. For the editors, the questions emerged from a longer collective and multidisciplinary inquiry into the possibilities of making tensions productive without constituting identities that either segregate into mutual indifference or confront one another in violent conflict.

Several figures of thoughts have helped explore the critical potential and limits of productive tensions. Multistable figures, for instance, where the same thing can appear under radically different, incommensurable aspects, provide the metaphor for an intriguing limit-case of productive tension: observing such an object, different observers can be in profound conflict with one another until they experience a so-called Gestalt-switch, demonstrating the very different ways the same sense perception can be integrated into a Gestalt or whole. If Ludwig Wittgenstein has shown how productive the experience of Gestalt-switches can be for philosophical investigations, the physicist Niels Bohr has proposed a principle of complementarity that functions in a similar way while arguably shifting from the psychology of sense perception or epistemology to an ontological level. Complementarity here is understood in a rather specific, technical sense implying not the relation of partial perspectives constituting parts that fit together harmoniously to form a whole but, on the contrary, the existence of mutually exclusive and thus contradictory descriptions that cannot be pictured together and yet are claimed to be equally needed for a fuller account. Taken in this sense, complementarity is a figure of incommensurability that resonates with sexual difference as conceived by Lacanian psychoanalysis insisting that ‘there is no sexual relationship’ or by Luce Irigaray speaking of ‘the sex which is not one’. While a symbolic order that constitutes one sex as lacking conjures up the phantasm of completion through the other sex, sexual difference can also be understood as a figure of excess that disrupts all attempts at integration, oneness, or wholeness and keeps insisting as an open question.

What must perhaps also remain open — if one wishes to retain the productive potential of tensions — is the question to what extent figures of thought can be abstracted from their original context and be
made to travel to other domains. Abstracting the figure of ‘wholes which are not one’ from that of ‘the sex which is not one’, for instance, may help us to think differently about not only sexuality, race, class, ability, or the particle-wave duality of quantum entities, but also the dissimilarities and non-equivalences in the constitution of different kinds of wholes.⁸

The starting point for this volume was thus the question of how wholes are differently constituted and how they in turn constitute, determine, and control their parts. Conjuring up this bidirectional constitution, the working title Constituting Wholes was meant to present a figure maintaining the importance of aspect shifts, suggesting a relation of complementarity between irreconcilable perspectives, and thereby inquiring into the losses incurred in moments of synthesis, unification, or totalization. The aim was on the one hand to approach classical part–whole relations from a new angle but on the other hand also to focus on the asymmetry inhering in such relations, which the figures of multistability or complementarity may seem to downplay. In the process of the year-long discussion leading up to this volume, the emphasis indeed fell on the power of wholes and on seeking ways of resisting and deconstituting them.

However, deconstitution need not mean destruction or full destitution. It can also include a process of (re)constituting wholes differently. This is a question not just of politics but rather, in the first instance, a question of the kinds of wholes considered, which in this volume range from organisms to history, from gendered, sexed, and raced selves to social classes, from individual art pieces to the sphere of art, from society to the world. This list points not only to a large variety of wholes but also to the possibility of nesting them and thereby making them more ambivalent. Resistance to a whole is thus often thought of in terms of a part insisting on its partiality as not fully subsumable under the whole. However, does this imply conjuring up the part’s wholeness and identity — as something lost, as something to be constituted independently from any relationship to the larger whole, or as the larger whole’s constitutive exclusion and condition of possibility? This suggests that the logic and power of wholes persist in resistance or refusal just as much — although in different ways — as in attempts at repairing not only the parts but also the larger whole, making it fully whole by integrating the parts that have had no part. Wrestling with the ambiguous functioning of wholes and the ambivalent attitudes towards them,
other figures of thought have come into focus while developing this volume, including loss, eclipse, dispossession, deflation, and expansion. But what has proved particular fruitful for the essays in this volume is to think with the figures of haunting and plasticity, both in their similarity and difference. These two figures share an emphasis on wholes rather than their putative parts. At the same time, they make it possible to highlight and conceptualize that a whole is rarely, if ever, all that it claims to be. It is indeed generally less than the sum of that from which it constitutes its parts. Like the intangibility of ghosts, this does not make it less real or effective. A whole’s power and violence lie rather precisely in its delimitations, hierarchizations, marginalizations, reductions, and exclusions. If this makes it necessary to focus on wholes — to identify them, and subject to critical inquiry that which from the whole’s perspective appears imperceptible — it does not imply an affirmation of wholes, let alone their reification. On the contrary, it requires partiality — but a partiality without parts. The interventions in this volume all embrace a partial perspective insofar as they do not pretend to present a view from nowhere. Yet they also resist speaking as or on behalf of a part that would be constituted as an identity or whole. Instead, they trouble the consistency and stability of wholes, breaking their closure and making them more dynamic without necessarily presupposing or producing parts, an outside, or a teleological development.

The figures of haunting and plasticity are equally ambivalent and contain multiple aspects that do not merely depend on the context at hand but can also coexist despite their apparent contradiction. If a haunted home is uncanny, unheimlich, it is because something happens secretly, heimlich, within the home, the Heim. Plasticity, in turn, evokes malleability, that is, a thing’s susceptibility to being shaped into all kinds of forms without it having an identity or will of its own. At the same time, the plastic arts produce sculptures that not only retain their shape but also impart it on others. What is more, (at least in French) one speaks of plastic as short for plastic explosives.

The social whole can be thought to be haunted by the ‘spectre’ of a radically different way of being organized and constituted, such as the spectre of communism that Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels famously invoked at the beginning of the Manifesto of the Communist Party. When all those in power join forces to hunt down such a spectre, they acknowledge its power, but their accounts remain partial and need to
be opposed by other accounts — in the form of a party’s manifesto, for instance — if the whole is to be destituted and reconstituted otherwise. If haunting could here seem to be inscribed in a narrative that is teleologically oriented towards the future realization of a utopian alternative, the figure of haunting also troubles linear temporalities by highlighting the persistence of the past in the present and by involving arguably always already a repetition — the coming-again of a revenant. Through their paradoxical entanglement or conflation of past, present, and future, of life and death, of matter and spirit, of absence and presence, ghosts challenge prevailing ontological assumptions and haunt any being. Arguing the ‘logic of haunting’ to be ‘larger and more powerful than an ontology or thinking of Being’, Jacques Derrida indeed sought to displace an ontology of presence by what he called a ‘hauntology’. As Colin Davis has noted, the work of Derrida differs from other hauntological approaches in that it is ultimately not interested in revealing, describing, and articulating — let alone realizing — what has been repressed into secrecy yet continues to haunt us. Instead, it mobilizes the spectre as a ‘deconstructive figure’ that does not merely destabilize what is taken for granted but lies outside the whole order of knowledge while opening us up to ‘the experience of secrecy as such’ and allowing ‘an insight into texts and textuality as such’. Davis contrasts this approach to the work of psychoanalysts Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok, in which phantoms are bound up with secrets that are unspeakable not due to a fundamental limitation of language and thought but rather in a more ‘restricted sense of being subject of shame and prohibition’. Here, phantoms are ‘gaps left by the secrets of others’, and such secrets ‘can and should be put into words so that the phantom and its noxious effects can be exorcized’.

In parallel to these approaches, Avery Gordon’s *Ghostly Matter: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination* (1995) proposes haunting as a method that enables a critical engagement with social wholes beyond the strictures of positivism in sociology and anthropology. The book ‘looks for a language for identifying hauntings and for writing with the ghosts any haunting inevitably throws up’. Challenging how disciplinary boundaries are drawn between ‘the study of literature (story/fiction) and social science (fact)’, it breaks open the relative autonomy or wholeness of separate disciplines. While her intervention into sociology draws much of her material from literature — such as the novels *Como en la guerra (He Who Searches)* by Luisa Valenzuela
and _Beloved_ by Toni Morrison — Gordon makes it clear that she is not concerned with ‘Literature as such’ but with social life.\(^\text{17}\) Acknowledging the importance of resisting the ideal of impartial objectivity, she highlights:

> [T]ruth is still what most of us strive for. Partial and insecure surely, and something slightly different from ‘the facts,’ but truth nonetheless […]. But truth is a subtle shifting entity not simply because philosophy says so or because evidentiary rules of validation are always inadequate, but because the very nature of the things whose truth is sought possesses these qualities.\(^\text{18}\)

Her argument is thus that the object of social science is characterized by a specific shiftiness or ghostliness, and it can be known and written only with a ‘method attentive to what is elusive, fantastic, contingent, and often barely there’, that is, ‘in the mode of haunting’.\(^\text{19}\) Indeed, she suggests that ‘haunting is a constitutive feature of social life’ and that it is necessary to find ways ‘to be haunted and to write from that location’. This does not mean becoming a well-constituted part within a social or disciplinary whole: writing from a haunted location ‘is not a methodology or a consciousness you can simply adopt or adapt as a set of rules or an identity’. Yet the point is to be partial: ‘We ought to do this not only because it is more exact, but also […] to the extent that we want our writing to change minds, to convince others that what we know is important and ought to matter’.\(^\text{20}\)

In order to get a better sense of the paradoxical way in which haunting involves wholes that are partial without constituting parts, a brief consideration of one of Gordon’s case studies may be helpful. Gordon notes towards the end of her analysis of Valenzuela’s novella that the story must be told ‘in the mode of haunting’ both because the story ‘is happening in and through haunting’ and because haunting is imagined to be an effective way of political mobilization (of the middle class). The context is the practice of ‘disappearance’ — the secret and officially denied abduction, torture, and usually death of people — during the Argentinean military regime of the late 1970s and the strategy of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo to resist the regime in weekly demonstrations carrying pictures of their disappeared children. In Gordon’s analysis, haunting spreads over several levels. In a most direct sense, the disappeared have a ghostly existence insofar as the state’s denial means that they hover between life and death, making it impos-
sible for their loss to be mourned by those left behind. While the uncertain fate of the disappeared thus haunt their loved ones, Gordon also argues that ‘disappearance is a state-sponsored procedure for producing ghosts to harrowingly haunt a population into submission’, that is, to haunt not only the relatives and friends of the disappeared but society as a whole. At the same time, the strategy of control through systematic disappearance requires maintaining a delicate balance of knowing and not knowing. Disappearance must be a ‘public secret’ of which enough is known to terrify everyone ‘but not enough either to have a clear sense of what is going on or to acquire the proof that is usually required by legal tribunals or other governments for sanction’. The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo used ‘the photographs to represent just this knowing and not knowing that is characteristic of disappearance, its terror and its political power’ and managed to turn it against the military regime, which became haunted in turn, as it were. While the junta ended up defining all disappeared as dead, the Mothers insisted on keeping the disappeared and their haunting alive. Although there could be no hope that the disappeared would return whole and alive, conjuring up their ghosts as ‘a symptom of what is missing’ meant to oppose the ‘false reconciliation that national-sponsored grieving for the dead […] promised’. What is more, it allowed for an encounter with the ‘specter of what the state has tried to repress’, which in Gordon’s analysis is ultimately not an individual or part but the utopian desire for a just world:

Their capacity to see in the face of the disappeared, or in a photo of a face, the ghost of the state’s brutal authority and simultaneously the ghost of the utopian impulse the state has tried to suppress allowed the Mothers to understand that any successful political response to disappearance had to get on the very ground of haunting.

In her conclusion, Gordon returns to this paradox of haunting, which ‘always harbors the violence, the witchcraft and denial that made it, and the exile of our longing, the utopian’, and she highlights that the ‘victorious reckoning with the ghost’ — which ‘registers’ a degraded present and ‘incites’ towards a future of plenitude — ‘always requires a partiality to the living’. The notion of haunting that contributions to this volume mobilize more or less explicitly resonates with Gordon’s in many ways. In particular, haunting is conceived less in view of an ‘alternative ontology’ —
no matter how ‘disjointed’ and ‘non-foundational’ — than as a method for exploring how objects, processes, and affects make themselves known in other than obvious terms. Insistently pointing to forms of historicity, violence, and dispossession, haunting disrupts the naturalness of evidence and the transparency of ‘things’, knowledge, or experience. In so doing, haunting troubles, interferes, and scrambles linear constructions. Facts, stories, and events inhere with traces, symptoms, cathexes, and drives that break through the diachronic flow of history. Neither time nor space remains intact when the tactility of everyday life is mediated by the labour of the negative. Indeed, thinking through hauntings haunts you back. It suggests an aporetic immanence that obfuscates any capacity for a totality or whole. Informed by psychoanalytic, feminist, queer, and postcolonial perspectives, the figure of haunting envisaged in this volume seeks less to ‘enlighten’ the shadow realms of knowledge production, experience, and relation, than to trouble them with the material manifestations and temporal traces of the unforeseeable, the unknown, the absent, and the invisible. The concern lies in searching for the uncanny visitations, the unintelligible events, the unuttered voices, and the nonsensical remnants in methods, archives, and systems of justice, desire, and death.

Taking the figure of haunting as a method has the potential of radically disrupting wholes through the paradox that their consistency can be diminished by ‘adding’ to them, that is, by insisting on the persistent traces of the lives, things, and possibilities that have been lost, gone missing, and excluded in the often violent process of a whole’s constitution. On first sight, it would seem that the figure of plasticity presents a lesser challenge to wholes insofar as it evokes malleability, that is, the ability of a thing to undergo continuous transformation without ever losing its integrity, wholeness, and thus also identity. However, it is only the numerical identity that is here retained, and while the figure of haunting emphasizes the persistence of the past in the present and for the future, the figure of plasticity makes it possible to account for changes that irreversibly lose any trace or memory of the past.

The notion of plasticity has recently gained prominence in a diverse set of fields and discourses, from biology to deconstructionism, from semantics to the neurosciences. It abandons the assumption that whole and part mutually determine or strain against each other, thus challenging, for instance, both the idea that the whole is constituted through subsumption and that this force can or ought to be resisted
according to a logic of exemption or excess. Plasticity instead reveals the radically transformative nature of the immanent and hence inextricable processes of the giving and receiving of forms, thus inviting us to consider the question of wholes beyond the classical dichotomies of components and composites, medium and form, identity and difference, inscription and erasure. While the figure of haunting also goes beyond these classical dichotomies, the figure of plasticity provides a different angle on the question whether it is possible to proceed not from a consideration of the ‘constituting’ (of the) whole but from its de-constitution in morphosis.

Plasticity is a notion that has been put forward particularly forcefully by Catherine Malabou, whose work also demonstrates the remarkable ‘plasticity of the concept of plasticity’. Malabou began ‘to form the concept of plasticity’ in her book *The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality and Dialectic* (2005 [1994]), which identifies Hegel’s manifold use of the term. Malabou has shown how plasticity always carries the double meaning of ‘a capacity to receive form and a capacity to produce form’ and is tightly associated with dialectical processes, especially of self-determination and self-formation. It becomes a ‘name for the originary unity of acting and being acted upon, of spontaneity and receptivity. A medium for the differentiation of opposites, plasticity holds the extremes together in their reciprocal action.’ Ultimately, plasticity also provides the condition for Malabou’s own project, which we might describe as trans-forming, stretching, and moulding a part so that it may hold (together), comprehend, and constitute a whole:

> To ‘form a concept’ in the sense intended here means first of all to take up a concept (*plasticity*), which has a defined and delimited role in the philosophy of Hegel, only in order to transform it into the sort of comprehensive concept that can ‘grasp’ (*saisir*) the whole.

Relying on the plasticity of concepts, which allows her ‘to elaborate as a whole all the instances of the Hegelian concept of plasticity’ by varying it in both extension and intelligibility, Malabou has thus arrived at a concept of plasticity that justifies her own operation performed ‘in the future of Hegel’s thought’ and that can be said to be ‘the point around which all the transformations of Hegelian thought revolve, the centre of its metamorphoses’. 
In her subsequent work, Malabou has further ‘elaborated’ the concept of plasticity by engaging with notions of being and time (Heidegger), *différance* and writing (Derrida), Levinas’ ethics of the Other, the death drive (Freud), and brain plasticity in neuroscience. Tracing a history of the concept of plasticity from Hegel to the present, her book *Plasticity at the Dusk of Writing: Dialectic, Destruction, Deconstruction* (2010) argues that ‘the concept of plasticity gradually asserted itself as the style of an era’ and that it did so over and against writing as theorized by Derrida in an ‘enlarged’, ‘transformed’, and ‘modified’ sense of ‘archewriting, that is, the general movement of the trace’.

The concept of plasticity is so plastic that it seems capable of absorbing, holding together, and organizing everything without leaving anything apart. Indeed, Malabou has referred it to the ‘spontaneous organization of fragments’, has seen it ‘endowed with a “dithyrambic gift for synthesis”’, and concludes *Plasticity at the Dusk of Writing* by proposing ‘closure’ as the focal object for a changed philosophical perspective. The incorporation of neuroscience is part of this aspect shift, for if plasticity is ‘establishing itself as the paradigmatic figure of organization in general’, it is neuroplasticity that provides ‘the most convincing example’. In particular, Malabou maintains that the ‘neuronic has become the paradigm to think what the social is’, that is, in particular, society as a closed but plastic structure.

However, it would be misleading to present Malabou’s work as aiming at and embracing an all-encompassing enclosure. Instead — and this is what makes her notion of plasticity particularly suggestive for the present volume — Malabou has proposed plasticity as an answer to the im/possibility of fleeing a closed system — a whole — which has ‘no outside, no “elsewhere”’. Envisaging the possibility of ‘escape within closure itself’ and of the ‘formation of a pathway as a “way out” in the absence of a “way out”’, she has named ‘“plasticity” the logic and economy of such a formation’ and has defined it as ‘the form of alterity without transcendence’.

The point is not merely that the ‘mutability of beings is what opens a future in the absence of any openness of the world’. Rather, plasticity offers a way of describing mutability beyond the paradigm of traces that are written or imprinted. As Malabou clarified at the end of her book, the ‘impossibility of fleeing means first of all the impossibility of fleeing oneself’, and it is the plasticity of the brain that she takes as metaphor for thinking a way out where there is no outside.
important element in her argument for the philosophical necessity of a new materialist thought ‘replacing grammatology with neurology’ is the insight that ‘neuronal traces don’t proceed as do writing traces: they do not leave a trace; they occur as changes of form.’

The paradox of a trace that leaves no trace becomes clearer in the books *The New Wounded: From Neurosis to Brain Damage* (2012) and *Ontology of the Accident: An Essay on Destructive Plasticity* (2012), in which Malabou addresses irreversible personality changes due to brain damage. Whatever occasions a transformation of the brain, it can certainly be said to produce a trace, but in doing so it can also erase past traces, or rather deform past transformations. Whereas Freud imagined the perceptive apparatus to work like a ‘Mystic Writing Pad’ that produces a palimpsest conserving all past traces, the brain imagined by Malabou is both more dynamic and fragile. Elaborated in reference to not only brain lesions from head traumas but also illnesses like Alzheimer and even ordinary ageing conceived not only as a process (involving a loss of plasticity) but also as an instantaneous event (which she links to explosive plasticity), her notion of destructive plasticity can hardly appear as a reassuring ‘escape within closure itself’. Malabou indeed has explicitly contrasted her notion of destructive plasticity to the ‘always positive’ connotations of plasticity in science, medicine, art, and education.

However, she does not invoke the ‘fact that all creation can only occur at the price of a destructive counterpart’ in order to justify — in a manner that in many contexts could appear rather cynical — an opening up to future generations through a clearing of the present. Instead, her work highlights that a transformation of the brain generally leads to the — plastic — formation of a new liveable identity, even as it implies the annihilation of a previous identity, and it can be experienced with indifference and without suffering.

Malabou has invoked Spinoza’s radically immanent *Ethics* as a rare instance of philosophy referring to ‘a destructive metamorphosis of the nature of a being, from whence a new being, who is in some senses a living-dead, is born’. While this sounds like the birth of a ghost, the point is that the new being is not haunted by its past nor spiritualized in any sense: ‘There is a destructive mutation that is not the transformation of the body into a cadaver, but rather the transformation of the body into another body in the same body.’ At least from the exterior,
such a transformation can even appear as progress, as Malabou implies when noting that for Spinoza,

> even childhood appears to be a change of this sort, an originary change, a metamorphosis prior to reason, which also prevents us from thinking that the ill can fall back into childhood, since childhood is no longer the certain and solid term of regression, but rather another state of ourselves towards which it is fundamentally impossible to regress since it is not stable. We return nowhere. Between life and death we become other to ourselves.⁴⁹

While Malabou quickly moves her focus onto the ill’s inability to regress, the implications are larger. Spinoza indeed suggested that the same discontinuity occurs in childhood so that any adult has become utterly other to his or her earlier state of being a baby.⁵⁰ The possibility of destructive mutation thus offers an even more radical challenge to classical psychoanalytic practice than Malabou has suggested in the *New Wounded*, where she invokes the neurological account of brain damage as a change of form in order to argue for the need of ‘new forms of treatment that would no longer be based on the investigation of the past, the exploration of memory, or the reactivation of traces’.⁵¹

Ultimately, destructive plasticity appears less as an ambivalent zero-sum game — where the value of creation is measured by the price of destruction — than as a bi-stable figure in which the context determines the aspect perceived. According to Malabou, destructive plasticity has

> the power to form identity through destruction — thus making possible the emergence of a psyche that has vacated itself, its past, and its ‘predecessors.’ In this sense, such plasticity has the power of creation *ex nihilo*, since it begins with the annihilation of an initial identity.⁵²

Depending on whether one is attached or averse to what is to be destroyed, destructive plasticity thus offers a dystopian or utopian model for pure negation without affirmation, be it in a dialectic sense or in the sense of Freudian ‘negation’ (*Verneinung*), which maintains the trace of the repressed and therefore also always the threat or promise of a return.⁵³

In many ways, plasticity appears as the antidote to haunting and vice versa. At the same time, both figures highlight the power of wholes and evoke different avenues of interventions that are partial without
relying on the construction of parts and their representation. Instead, they concern the whole as a whole, its consistency, its destabilization through addition of what it misses or has lost, or its destitution, which for better or worse coincides with the restitution of a (different) whole.

All the essays in this volume deal with some aspects of haunting or plasticity, sometimes both, while often complicating their opposition and showing the specific and entangled ways in which they operate in different archives. The first essay is Volker Woltersdorff’s ‘Sexual Ghosts and the Whole of History: Queer Historiography, Post-Slavery Subjectivities, and Sadomasochism in Isaac Julien’s The Attendant’. It discusses the controversial concept of wholeness in historiography with regard to the fascination with past horrors and the desire to do justice to their victims who retain a ghostly presence. The essay retraces how this commitment produces a dilemma, as it can result either in the aspiration to historical wholeness as full memorialization or alternatively in the radical rejection of wholeness as an impossible healing. Employing Elizabeth Freeman’s notion of ‘erotohistoriography’, Woltersdorff introduces affect into the work of historiography in order to find an escape from the dilemmatic impasse between history’s wholeness as pacified reconciliation and as ongoing catastrophe along the lines of Walter Benjamin. Sadomasochism is presented as a practice that may correspond most adequately to the paradoxical affect caused by traumatic history that continues to haunt the present. Indeed, re-enactments of historical oppression and violence occur frequently within the BDSM community. However, what distinguishes them from ‘living history’ re-enactments is their potential to modify affective attachments to history by altering the historical script. The essay elaborates this potential through Isaac Julien’s 1993 short film The Attendant, which, in a kind of queer re-enactment, overwrites the memory of colonial chattel slavery by a sadomasochistic encounter of a black guardian and a white visitor in a museum dedicated to the history of slavery. The film raises the ethical and political question of how to relate affectively to the legacy and ongoing presence of racism. Against this backdrop, the author argues that, through the BDSM scenario and its changes to the historical script, Julien’s film represents and promotes a paradoxical way to perform both the memorialization and the forgetting of past horrors and pleasures. Here, historical wholeness acquires a conflicting double meaning of both achieving completeness and restoring integrity. Woltersdorff concludes by interpreting The Attendant as urging a utopian
perspective, produced by the tension between the impossibility of history’s wholeness and the necessary, reparative desire for it. The article concludes by highlighting the paradox that Julien’s film shows wholeness ‘to be impossible and yet necessary’ and ‘expresses a necessary desire made impossible’. While the essay explicitly engages with the figure of haunting, one could perhaps speak here also of plasticity insofar as the contradictory conjunction of remembering and forgetting seems to rely on a malleability of affects and on producing an affective economy that sustains the fantasmatic remembrance of a painful past through paradoxical pleasure but breaks with any pleasure derived from real inequality, injustice, or suffering imparted non-consensually.

Ruth Preser’s essay ‘Things I Learned from the Book of Ruth: Diasporic Reading of Queer Conversions’ performs another kind of queer appropriation of history. The Book of Ruth is a biblical narrative that opens with two women, Naomi the Israelite, a bereaved woman who wishes to return from Moab to Judea, and her no-longer-daughter-in-law Ruth the Moabite, who pledges to follow Naomi, turning away from her gods and people. This laconic tale of nomadic intimacies and speech-acts of pledges and conversions has become an iconic narrative and a seminal text in Judaism, and it has also been appropriated by contemporary feminist and lesbian readings. Indeed, since it is not fully narrated but rather full of gaps, voids, and ‘ghostly matters’, the Book of Ruth provides apt ground and a malleable vessel for contemporary appropriation by stories seeking incarnation beyond linear or teleological constraints. In Preser’s ‘palimpsest reading’, the biblical tale continues to communicate a story of successful assimilation of the poor and the foreign, and of a ‘home-coming’, but it is troubled by displacement, unresolved diasporic longing, and an acute and continuous sense of vulnerability. Thinking with Avery Gordon’s modality of haunting, Preser’s reading aims to understand contemporary forms of dispossession and their impact, especially when their oppressive nature is denied. It reflects on what kind of theory might emerge by remobilizing the category of ‘home’ through its de-constitution, through movement rather than destination, through disintegration rather than determination. Troubled by questions of race, nomadism, gender, and sexuality, in an era when (some) bodies may traverse national, sexual, and class borders, Preser’s investigation asks what happens to bodies that continuously signify precarity and loss.
Similar concerns inform the questions that Eirini Avramopoulou asks in her essay ‘Claims of Existence between Biopolitics and Thanatopolitics’. How is the desire for existence implicated in the experience of identity as wound? Under which conditions does the demand for desire appear to confront the repetition of trauma? Or else, what echoes in the last breath of someone dying? In Istanbul, a city built upon neoliberal structures of governance and cosmopolitan aesthetics, and defined by severe policing and local histories of ethnic and gender violence, these questions reflect upon a particular historical and political period through a personal story. The essay focuses on a transgender activist named Ali, his fight against transphobia, his illness and death, while reflecting on the 2013 public uprising in Istanbul following attempts by the Turkish government to demolish Gezi park. By exploring the notion of spectral survival as a political praxis, it argues that this notion, rather than acceding to claims over a fuller subjectivity, mobilizes an aporia of de-subjectivation. De-constituting the ‘I’ here attests to an attempt neither to reconfigure its parts nor to merely perceive life as dismantled, but rather to speak of a loss that no familiar language can yet describe. The spectrality of this ‘I’ troubles and repoliticizes, then, the very notion of haunting, as it lays claims to its own differing and deferral from the constitution of a proper name, or of a ‘self’-acclaimed existence, especially when the fight for existence here is also a performative assertion of loss and death connected to processes of resisting sexist, neoliberal, heteronormative, and phallogocentric representations of possession and belonging.

The de-constitution of the ‘I’ is also at the centre of Manuele Gagnolati’s essay ‘Differently Queer: Temporality, Aesthetics, and Sexuality in Pier Paolo Pasolini’s Petrolio and Elsa Morante’s Aracoeli’. The essay explores the relationship between temporality, aesthetics, and sexuality in the final novels of two twentieth-century Italian authors: Pasolini’s Petrolio (1972–75) and Morante’s Aracoeli (1982). Both novels mobilize a form of temporality that resists a sense of linear and teleological development and that instead appears contorted, inverted, and suspended. The article argues that both novels thereby allow for the articulation of queer desires and pleasures that cannot be inscribed in normative logics of completion, progression, or productivity. It shows how the aesthetics of Pasolini’s and Morante’s texts replicate the movement of queer subjectivity and dismantle the traditional structure of the novel but do so differently. The fractured and dilated movement of
Petrolio’s textuality corresponds to a post-Oedipal and fully formed subject who is haunted by his complicity with bourgeois power and wants to shatter and annihilate himself by replicating the paradoxical pleasure of non-domesticated sexuality. Aracoeli, by contrast, has a ‘formless form’ (‘forma senza forma’) that corresponds to the position of never completing the process of subject formation by adapting to the symbolic order. The poetic operation of Morante’s novel consists in staging an interior journey, backwards along the traces of memory and the body and at the same time forward towards embracing the partiality and fluidity of an inter-subjectivity that is always in the process of becoming.

Filippo Trentin’s essay ‘Warburg’s Ghost: On Literary Atlases and the “Anatopic” Shift of a Cartographic Object’ analyses the atlas as a method of assemblage in literary theory. It takes issue with the use of cartography advocated by proponents of a ‘spatial turn’ within literary studies, including Malcolm Bradbury’s Atlas of Literature, Franco Moretti’s Atlas of European Literature, and Sergio Luzzatto and Gabriele Pedullà’s Atlante della letteratura italiana. While these atlases claim to dismantle the normative canon of historicism and to offer a different way of gathering knowledge, Trentin argues that they often risk reproducing analogous positivistic, hierarchical, and colonizing assumptions. Showing a totalizing attitude embedded in modern atlases and in the ‘cartographic reason’ emerging from the sixteenth century onwards, the essay proposes a speculative and heuristic use of the term ‘anatopy’ that aims to capture the disorienting potentialities that are intrinsic to non-cartographic explorations of space. In particular, it interprets Aby Warburg’s Bilderatlas Mnemosyne as an ‘anatopic’ object that keeps troubling any purely cartographic use of the atlas. In Trentin’s reading, by theorizing an anti-foundational (and anti-identitarian) method of knowledge organization based on the morphological affect between disparate images and objects, Warburg’s project leads to the profanation of the atlas as a topographical machine and, with its recurrences, intervals, and voids, destitutes its traditional apparatus of power. This disparate and anti-holistic aesthetic disposition challenges the solid foundations of the constructions of historicism and cartographic reason. It breaks up the technical explanation of cause and effect and substitutes it with a ‘danced causality’, which Trentin relates to Leo Bersani’s idea of ‘aesthetic subject’ and the possibility of moving beyond an immobile and filial principle of identity formation towards a virtual
and impersonal one that is located beyond the ‘ego’, as well as beyond the rigid borders of cartographic reason and the linearity of positivistic historicism.

A different take on knowledge, history, and totalization is presented in Jamila Mascat’s essay ‘Hegel and the Ad-venture of the Totality’, which aims at exploring the controversial notion of the Hegelian totality. Countering Louis Althusser’s critique of Hegel’s ‘expressive totality’, where every part is thought to expresses the whole, it proposes to consider such a speculative figure as a temporalizing instance situated at the entanglement of Knowing and History. Firstly, it illustrates the paradoxical inclination of Hegel’s totality to being both complete and a never-ending task. Secondly, it analyses the accomplishment of totality at the peak of the *Science of Logic*, focusing on the temporal circularity of the Concept (*Begriff*). Thirdly, drawing on the readings of Alexandre Koyré, Alexandre Kojève, and Jean Hyppolite, the essay illustrates the peculiar relation between becoming and eternity that is located at the heart of Hegel’s conception of time. Finally, it approaches the last section of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* devoted to Absolute Knowing in order to highlight the twofold movement of seizure (*Begreifen*) and release (*Entlassen*) that characterizes the activity of the Spirit and that is constitutive of the contingent ad-venture of the totality as a philosophical achievement. In other words, it is by embracing contingency as its limit that Absolute Knowing reaffirms the status of its absoluteness precisely because of its capacity to sacrifice itself and let it go. Critically engaging with Catherine Malabou’s reading of plasticity in Hegel, Mascat highlights that Absolute Knowing is a process of totalization that entails cuts and interruptions. The essay shows that the Hegelian totality may be interpreted and actualized as a theoretical construct densely charged with temporal and historical implications: on the one hand, totality expresses a timely standpoint for thought — the standpoint of Hegel’s age, which is, as claimed by the philosopher at the end of his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, ‘for the time being completed’, as well as the standpoint of the present time to be speculatively accomplished; on the other hand, Hegel’s idea of a speculative totalization sets for the philosophies yet to come the never-ending task of constituting and re-constituting wholes.

A paradigm for thinking about wholes, their constitution and re-production, has long been provided by living organisms. While the emphasis is often on the relation between parts and wholes — between
the functionally differentiated organs and the organism, or, on a lower level, between cells and organs — Robert Meunier and Valentine Reynaud’s essay ‘The Innate Plasticity of Bodies and Minds: Integrating Models of Genetic Determination and Environmental Formation’ poses the question of the whole in biology with respect to the organism and its environment. A developmental system involves not only what we conventionally discern as the organism, that is, initially, the fertilized egg and the cellular mass arising from it by cell division, but also the physical and biological surrounding of the developing embryo. In the sense that not every aspect of the environment plays a role, the organism as part of the system constitutes this whole by determining what has an effect on the process and what does not. On the other hand, by not only enabling development or providing material but instead shaping the process in specific ways, the whole of organism–environment interactions constitutes its part, i.e., the developing organism. If there are therefore different, potentially incommensurable constitutions of the whole developmental system, there are also different ways of identifying the relevant units of selection in evolution, such as the living organism as a whole or the genes as the units of replication. In their essay, Meunier and Reynaud argue for a view on development and evolution that integrates notions of environmental influence and genetic determination. The notion of plasticity that has recently gained currency in the life sciences seems to oppose genetic determination and innateness by underlining the importance of environmental influence. However, while morphological and cognitive development is indeed plastic and sensitive to the environment, the essay emphasizes that the mechanisms and elements enabling a system to respond to influences must be available for development to happen in the first place. These resources for development are not homogeneous ‘stuff’ that becomes formed by the environment through the course of development. Instead, they are highly structured and specific and thus enable specific responses to contextual conditions. Under varying conditions they will of course appear in different combinations and produce different outcomes. Thus, they enable plasticity. And yet, as they are specific mechanisms and elements, which mainly gain their specificity from the structure of the genetic material on which the environment can act, it appears appropriate to refer to them as innate.

Considering organism and environment as a whole that both constitutes the organism and is constituted by it and that is subject to evo-
olution depending not only on the selection of genetic mutations but also on the organism’s innate capacity to undergo plastic transformation and produce novelty through large-scale variation, offers ways of intervening into the long tradition of using organic metaphors in the description of other wholes, such as society and art. Arnd Wedemeyer’s article focuses on the German artist Joseph Beuys (1921–86), who did not shy away from describing the social order with traditional organic metaphors, such as the notion of a ‘central organ’. However, it is above all the — plastic — relationship between society and art that is at issue in Wedemeyer’s article, entitled ‘Pumping Honey: Joseph Beuys at the *documenta 6*. Using the term ‘Soziale Plastik’, Beuys not only classified his own artistic practice as essentially sculptural but, more importantly, thematized its heterogeneous yet anything but passive relationship to art market, exhibition, museum, and various modes of reception, as well as staked its political claim. Wedemeyer looks at Beuys’s contribution to the 1977 *documenta*, ‘Honey Pump at the Workplace’, in order to argue that the layered invocation of plasticity characteristic of Beuys’s practice and theorizing ought not be historicized, as is commonly done, as an instantiation of the excessive, transgressive — and quite possibly disingenuous — zeal of the neo-avant-garde. Beuys’s ‘Plastik’ should not be confused with anti-aesthetic formlessness, base materialism, a post-Duchampian ruination of the *objet trouvé*, and least of all a Neoromantic or Wagnerian projection or hypostatization of the autonomous work of art. The avant-gardes of the twentieth century have rendered the relationship of art and aesthetics tenuous at best, their artistic ‘innovations’ straining against the supratemporally or anthropologically defined characteristics of aesthetic valuation, play, or force. While many have sought to address this problem by tethering art to society in a shared ‘contemporaneity’, the article explores the implications of recasting this relation as one of plasticity, using the conceptual richness harvested by Catherine Malabou.

The volume closes with another essay focused on aesthetic production, this time via the figure of the eclipse, which might be taken as the figure of a destructive plasticity that leaves no trace. Marcus Coelen’s essay ‘An Eclipse of the Screen: Jorge Semprún’s Scripts for Alain Resnais’ starts from the assumption that the peculiar status of film scripts (not written to be read as such) can be illustrated by the figure of their *eclipse*. For they are, in inverting the very logic of the figure they invite, eclipsed for the sake of and by the fractured light on the screen they
help to produce. Yet just as the sun, obscured by the ‘black writing’ of the moon, leaves an ephemeral contour in the skies — a spectacle to many when happening — so too can the script that is made to disappear by the screen be assumed to draw its own particular and even more vanishing traits into the movie that is given not only to sight but also to thought. The analyses and critical constructions proposed by Coelen try to detect such traits in the work of Jorge Semprún the screenwriter. Writing not only for movies by Alain Resnais — most notably *La guerre est finie* (1966) and *Stavisky* (1974) — but also publishing versions of them after their release and calling those versions ‘scénarios’ despite various divergences and subtly violent inversions of the movies’ images, the screenwriter’s figure describes yet another twist of the eclipse. It can be assumed not only that Semprún strongly resisted the influence of the constellation formed by writing and cinematographic shooting, as well as projecting, but furthermore that this writing was almost imperceptibly yet essentially directed against the eclipse it was drawn into. No minor forces are conjured up in this enterprise. Driven by the desire to re-appropriate cinema’s a-personal and anti-psychological movement, to domesticate the images of scribbling lights drifting away from the mental and into thought — as well as into a history not mastered —, Semprún attempted to shape mastery itself and most traditional forms of authorship, along with memory and agency, in order to cloud the eclipse of script — that is, we might add, to conjure up a ghost recovering the trace of what has been eclipsed so that it may continue to haunt.

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NOTES


2 Cf. the ICI Berlin Core Project Tension/Spannung (2007–13) <https://www.ici-berlin.org/past-core-projects/core-project-2007-14> [accessed 16 July 2016], which has already led to several publications, including Tension/Spannung, ed. by Christoph F.E. Holzhey (Vienna: Turia + Kant, 2010).


10 Cf. Donna J. Haraway, ‘Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism


14 Ibid., pp. 374 and 378.


16 Ibid., p. 25.

17 Ibid., p. 27.

18 Ibid., p. 20.

19 Ibid., pp. 26 and 132.

20 Ibid., p. 22.

21 Ibid., p. 115.

22 Ibid., p. 110.

23 Ibid., pp. 63 and 115.

24 Ibid., p. 128.

25 Ibid., pp. 207–08.


27 This last paragraph is a slight modification of the description that Eirini Avramopoulou, Peta Hinton, Ruth Preser, and Filippo Trentin wrote for the panel ‘Haunting’ at the ICI Workshop ‘De-Constituting Wholes’ on 9–10 July 2014 <https://www.ici-berlin.org/event/613/> [accessed 23 August 2016].

28 This last paragraph is a slight modification of the description that Jamila Mascat, Robert Meunier, Stefano Osnaghi, and Arnd Wedemeyer wrote for the panel ‘Plasticity’ at the ICI Workshop ‘De-Constituting Wholes’ on 9–10 July 2014 <https://www.ici-berlin.org/event/613/> [accessed 23 August 2016].


30 Ibid., pp. 9 and 12.

31 Ibid., p. 186.

32 Ibid., p. 5.

33 Ibid., p. 13, emphasis added. Malabou lifts the notion of ‘elaborating a concept’ as giving ‘the function of a form’ to a concept through variation, generalization, exportation beyond its original domain, and modelization from Georges Canguilhem. See ibid., p. 7.

35 Malabou, *Plasticity at the Dusk of Writing*, pp. 1 and 12, emphasis removed. Malabou explicitly suggests that it is the ‘plasticity of the concept of writing’ that ‘enabled and legitimized [Derrida’s] displacement, modification, or mutation of the meaning of writing’ (p. 12).

36 Ibid., pp. 7 and 82.

37 Ibid., p. 59.


40 Ibid., p. 78.

41 Ibid., pp. 81–82.

42 Ibid., pp. 77 and 79.


46 Malabou, *The New Wounded*, p. 48: ‘it is important to understand — because this is fundamentally what is at stake within psychopathology today — that the disruption of cerebral auto-affection does not put an end to psychic life. […] There is a postlesional plasticity that is not the plasticity of reconstruction but the default formation of a new identity with loss as its premise.’

47 Malabou, *Ontology of the Accident*, p. 18.

48 Ibid., pp. 33–34.

49 Ibid., p. 34.

50 Benedictus de Spinoza, *Ethics*, in *Complete Works*, trans. by Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002), pp. 213–382 (4p39, sch.; p. 342): ‘A man of advanced years believes their nature to be so different from his own that he could not be persuaded that he had ever been a baby if he did not draw a parallel from other cases.’


52 Ibid., p. 68.

53 See Freud’s ‘Negation (1925)’, in *Standard Edition* xxi: 1923–1925, pp. 235–42; and Malabou’s discussion of different types of negation, especially in the sixth section of *The Ontology of the Accident*, pp. 73–91.

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